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THE REASONS FOR WAGE RIGIDITY: EVIDENCE FROM A 
SURVEY OF FIRMS* 
CARL M. CAMPBELL III AND KUNAL S. KAMLANI 
A survey of 184 firms was conducted to mvestIgate the reasons for wage ngid-
ity The strongest support was found for explanations based on adverse selection 
in quits and on the effect of wages on effort. In addition, survey respondents mdi-
cated that reducmg turnover IS an Important explanation of wage ngIdIty for 
wrute-collar workers, and that implicIt contracts are an important explanation for 
other workers. Respondents also belIeved that effort responds more strongly to 
wage decreases than to wage mcreases and that wage decreases have a greater 
Impact on the effort of low-skIlled workers than of hIgh-skIlled workers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One challenge facing economists is to explain why firms do 
not appear to adjust wages very much in response to labor mar-
ket conditions, particularly why there seem to be so few wage 
cuts when unemployment is high. Over the past twenty years, 
several theories have been developed to explain why firms may 
find it optimal to refrain from cutting wages in recessions, even 
though wage reductions would decrease labor costs. Five of the 
most prominent of these theories are contract theory, I implicit 
contract theory, efficiency wage theory, fair wage theory, and 
insider-outsider theory, each of which is briefly described in Table 
I. Using this theoretical work as a guide, we attempted to deter-
mine the most important reasons for wage rigidity by surveying 
individuals responsible for setting wages. 
Surveys of firms' wage-setting policies have also been con-
ducted by Kaufman [1984], Blinder and Choi [1990], Bewley 
[1994, 1995],2 and Agell and Lundborg [1995]. The composition of 
firms in their samples and their main results are summarized in 
* We would lIke to thank Patncia Anderson, Truman Bewley, Kenneth EI-
zmga, Jack Knetsch, Andrew Oswald, Jonathan Skinner, Andrew WeISS, seminar 
partIcIpants at the NBER BehaVIoral MacroeconomIcs Workshop, and two anony-
mous referees for valuable comments on earlIer verSIOns of thIS paper. Fmancml 
support from the John Hartman Summer Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 As reported m Compensatwn and Workmg Condttwns [1994], 12 3 percent 
of workers were represented by labor unions, and 11.2 percent ofpnvate workers 
were actually members of labor unions. WhIle contract theory is probably an Im-
portant explanation of wage ngIdIty for these workers, wntten contracts are prob-
ably not a source of wage ngidIty for the vast maJonty of workers, so thIS study 
does not deal extensively wIth contract theory. 
2 Bewley is m the process of writmg a book descnbing rus findings. The 
references m trus study are to presentatIOns he made concernmg prelimmary re-
sults of hIS survey 
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Implicit contract theory 
EfficIency wage theory 
a. ShIrkmg model 
b Gift-exchange model 
c Adverse selectlon model 
d Turnover model 
Fair wage-effort hypothesIs 
InsIder-outsIder theory 
TABLE I 
THEORIES OF WAGE RIGIDITY 
Source of wage rIgIdIty 
Long-term contracts between firms and workers set wages m advance and are negotlated on a 
staggered baSIS [FIscher 1977, Taylor 19791-
Workers are rIsk averse, prefernng a real wage that IS stable over the business cycle to one 
that rIses m expanSIOns and falls m receSSIOns. A firm offerIng ItS workers a steady wage 
could therefore pay an average wage below what it would otherwIse have to pay because it 
would be gIving workers a compensating differential in return for the lower average wage. 
ThIS rIsk averSIOn gives firms and workers an mcentlve to reach an Implicit understanding 
that the wage WIll be kept stable over the busmess cycle [Bally 1974; Gordon 1974; AzarIadls 
1975; Stlghtz 1986]. 
Workers' productIvity depends positively on the wage [Solow 1979; Yellen 1984; Stightz 1986]. 
The cost of losmg one's Job depends posItlvely on the wage, so that a higher wage will mduce 
fewer workers to shIrk and rIsk dismissal [ShapIro and Stlghtz 1984] 
Workers VIew a hIgher wage as a gIft from the firm, IndUCIng them to work harder as a gIft to 
the firm [Akerlof 1982, 1984]. 
A hIgher wage raises the average quality of a firm's applicant pool In addItIOn, adverse 
selectIOn may also apply to qUIts, SInce a firm's most productlve workers are the most hkely to 
qUIt If It cuts wages [WeIss 1980, 1990] 
Workers' quit rates depend negatlvely on the firm's wage. Thus, a firm paYing hlgher wages 
Wlll have lower costs of hIrIng and training new workers. In additlon, ItS workers on average 
Will have acqUIred more firm-specIfic human capital, making them more productlve than 
SImIlar IndIvIduals WIth no experIence at the firm [Stlghtz 1974; Schhcht 1978, Salop 1979, 
HashImoto and Yu 1980]. 
If workers' wages are below theIr perceIved faIr wage, then their effort depends on the ratio of 
theIr wage to theIr perCeIved faIr wage [Akerlof and Yellen 1990]. 
FIrms do not dIsmISS theIr current workers (1 e , mSIders) and hIre the unemployed (1 e , 
outsIders) at a lower wage because of the cost of hlrmg and trammg new workers and because 
of the abIlity of insiders to harass or not cooperate with new entrants hIred to replace 
dismissed inSIders. The costs of replacmg mSIders With outsIders gives insiders a great deal of 
power in setting their own wage [Lindbeck and Snower 1988] 
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Table II. Note that the samples used by these researchers were 
concentrated in certain geographical areas, or in the case of Agell 
and Lundborg, included only manufacturing firms. In addition, 
Blinder and Choi and Agell and Lundborg concentrated on large 
firms, while Kaufman concentrated on small firms. To extend this 
work, we tried to survey a more representative sample of firms 
and to ask a more detailed set of questions. In addition, our sur-
vey asked separate questions about broad occupational groups, 
and the questions were less open-ended than those in some previ-
ous surveys, making the responses easier to quantify. 
The methodology of our survey is described in Section II. Sec-
tion III discusses the responses to a part of the survey in which 
participants were asked to evaluate the importance of various 
statements, based on theories of wage rigidity, in explaining why 
their firm does not normally cut wages as low as possible during 
recessions (if their firm does not do this). In Section IV we present 
the responses to more detailed questions concerning the explana-
tions that were rated most highly in Section III. Section V pro-
vides a brief conclusion. 
Respondents indicated that the greatest deterrents to wage 
cuts are adverse selection as it applies to quits and the fear that 
wage cuts would generate negative feelings among workers and 
thereby lead to less effort. In addition, firms' desire to decrease 
hiring and training costs and to retain workers with firm-specific 
human capital was rated as an important factor in explaining the 
rigidity of wages, particularly for white-collar workers. Respon-
dents also considered implicit contract theory to be a reasonable 
explanation of wage rigidity for blue-collar and less skilled work-
ers. On the other hand, the responses to our survey were not sup-
portive of the efficiency wage model based on shirking or of a 
literal interpretation of insider-outsider models. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SURVEY 
The 184 firms in this study were drawn from several sources. 
Most of the survey respondents were compensation executives in 
Business Week 1000 corporations. Since this sample consisted of 
large firms, which may not be representative of the entire econ-
omy, we also included some smaller firms in our sample. The Ap-
pendix describes our survey design and sample population, and 
Table III provides descriptive statistics about our sample popula-
tion. These figures were obtained from questions about firms' pri-






















RESULTS OF PREVIOUS SURVEYS 
Study Sample ComposItion 
Kaufman [1984J The sample consIsted of 26 BntIsh firms m Wales, 
the West MIdlands, and the Greater London area, 
concentratmg on small nonumomzed firms The 
medIan firm SIze was seven employee", and only 
SIX firms had more than 50 employees 
Blmder and ChOl [1990J 19 large firms m New Jersey and eastern 
Pennsylvama were mterv18wed. These firms were 
selected from Ward's Busmess Dlrectory of U. S 
FIrms, which lIsts compames wIth annual sale" of 
more than $11 mIllIon. 
Bewley [1994, 1995J 258 firms, located mostly m ConnectIcut, were 
mterviewed There was much vanatIOn between 
mterVlews m the tOpICS dIscussed and m the 
questIOns asked of respondents, BO most of the 
study mvolves anecdotal eVIdence. The sample 
was obtained by networkmg The imtial set of 
mterYlews was obtamed through friends, 
relatIves, and calls to local firms Dunng these 
mterVIeWS respondents were asked for the names 
of addItIonal contacts, and thIS process was 
contmued m subsequent mtervIews 
Agell and Lundborg [1995J 179 SwedIsh manufacturmg firms were surveyed 
The medIan and mean firm SIze were, 
respectIvely, 574 and 1154 employees, meanmg 
that theIr sample mostly consIsted oflarge frms 
In addItIon, the overall umomzatIOn rate of firms 
m theIr sample was 92 percent. 
Mam results 
FIrms were asked If they could find qualIfied personnel 
at less than current wages, and rf so, what prevents 
the firm from cuttmg wages The most common 
response to the latter questIOn was that wage 
reductIons would upset workers and that theIr 
response would be a reduction m work effort 
Strong support was found for theones of wage ngrdlty 
involvmg faIrness and labor turnover 
The most Important reason why firms generally do not 
cut pay dunng a receSSIOn IS that they fear a pay cut 
would adversely affect workers' morale and 
mohvatlOn In addItIon, respondents mdIcated that 
morale IS related more to wage changes, partIcularly 
wage decreases, than to wage levels 
Workers' concerns about faIrness and relatIve wages 
play an Important role m explammg why firms do not 
normally cut wages In recessIOnary penods 





Percent less skIlled 
TABLE III 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Mean Standard dey Medlan 
11,927.1 23,65736 3800.0 
14.7% 26.60 0.0% 
44.9% 28.79 400% 
19.7% 22.20 130% 







Comparison Between the Industrial ComposItion of the Sample and the Indus-
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mary product or service (which were converted to the appropriate 
SIC code), the number of workers employed at the firm (in all 
establishments), the percentage of workers who are unionized, 
and the percentage of workers classified as white-collar, blue-
collar, and less skilled, as defined III the text. 
The reasons for wage rigidity may differ across occupational 
groups. Thus, workers were divided into three broad categories-
highly skilled white-collar, highly skilled blue-collar, and less 
skilled-and many questions asked the respondent to provide an-
swers for the two groups of workers who were most highly rep-
resented in the firm's workforce. Highly skilled white-collar work-
ers were defined as white-collar workers with at least two years 
of college or more than 160 hours of training, where training was 
defined as any apprenticeships, vocational training, or formal 
training inside or outside the firm. Highly skilled blue-collar 
workers were defined as blue-collar workers who perform jobs re-
quiring special skills or more than 160 hours of training. Less 
skilled workers were defined as workers performing jobs requir-
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
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ing less than two years of college and no more than 160 hours of 
training. In the dIScussion of the results, highly skilled white-
collar and highly skilled blue-collar workers are referred to as 
white-collar and blue-collar workers, respectlvely. 
In addition, the reasons for wage rigidity may differ across 
firms. To examine these differences, we created six subsamples of 
firms by dividing the sample between firms in goods-producing 
industries and firms in servIce-producing industries,3 between 
small to midsized firms (firms with less than 1000 employees) 
and large firms, and between highly unionized firms (more than 
30 percent unionIzed) and less unionized firms.4 
When there is a distmction between real and nominal wage 
rIgIdity,5 the questions dealt wIth nominal wages, because re-
spondents probably have a better comprehension of nominal 
wages than of real wages and because research for the United 
States suggests that nominal wages are more downwardly l'lgld 
than real wages. For example, McLaughlin [1994]; Lebow, Stock-
ton, and Wascher [1995]; Card and Hyslop [1996]; and Kahn 
[forthcoming] found that nominal wage changes are asymmetri-
cally distributed, with a disproportionate number of workers ex-
periencing exactly a zero percent yearly change in their nominal 
wage. Furthermore, the last three of these studIes found that 
fewer workers receive nominal wage cuts than would be expected 
from the distribution of wages. In contrast, the studies that ex-
amined real wages6 did not find the same degree of asymmetry in 
the distribution of real wage changes or evidence of an unusual 
number of workers receiving exactly a zero percent real wage 
change. 7 
3 The goods-producmg mdustnes are mmmg, constructIOn, and manufac-
tUrIng, and the servlce-producIllg muustnes are transportatIOn and publIc utlh-
ties, wholesale and retaIl trade, serVIces, and finance, msurance, and real estate 
4 There were 118 firms (64.1 percent) m the subsample of large firms, 66 
firms (35 9 percent) m the subsample of small to mldslzed firms, 38 firms (20 7 
percent) III the subsample of hIghly umomzed firms, 146 firms (79 3 percent) m 
the subsample ofless umomzed firms, 65 firms (35 3 percent) m the subsample of 
firms producmg goods, and 119 firms (647 percent) m the subsample of firms 
producmg servIces The average scores from these vanous subsamples are not 
repOltcd because of space lImItatIOn, but a table presentmg thE'se results IS avaIl-
able from the authors upon request 
5 Many questJOns dealt wIth Issues such as why firms may not cut wages as 
low as pOSSIble III recessIOns or how relative wages vnthlll the firm affect effort 
and morale For these questIOns, the dlstmctIOn between real and nommal wages 
has lIttlE' meanmg 
6 See McLaughllll [1994] and Card and Hyslop 11996] 
7 An addltlOnal reason for focusmg on nommal rather than real wages 18 
that research by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [19861 and Campbell [1995a1 
suggests that workers respond dIfferently to a real wage decrease caused by an 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
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III. COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPLANATIONS FOR WAGE RIGIDITY 
In part of the survey, respondents were given a series of 
statements based on various theories of wage rigidity and were 
asked to indicate the importance of each in explaining why their 
firm normally does not cut wages during recessions to the 1.owest 
level at which it can find the necessary number of qualified work-
ers (if their firm normally does not cut wages as low as possible 
in recessions).8 While these statements are not exhaustive of the 
possible reasons for wage rigidity, they represent some of the 
most important explanations that have been advanced in recent 
years. Respondents were asked to rate each statement as not im-
portant, of minor importance, moderately important, or very im-
portant. These responses were converted into numerical scores 
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing not important and 4 representing 
very important. A similar coding scheme was used by Blinder 
[1991] in his study of price rigidity, and he considered an average 
over 2.5 as reasonably strong and an average over 3.0 as very 
strong. Respondents were also asked which reason was the single 
most important one for not cutting wages in a recession. 
mcrease m pnces than to a real wage decrease caused by a cut in nominal wages. 
In partIcular, workers appear to react less strongly and WIth a longer lag to a real 
wage decrease that results from an increase m prices than to a real wage decrease 
that results from a cut in nommal wages In Kahnernan, Knetseh, and Thaler's 
sUIvey, 62 percent of respondents claImed that It was unfair for a firm in an area 
WIth hIgh unemployment and no mflation to cut wages by 7 percent, but only 22 
percent felt that It was unfaIr for the same firm to raIse wages by only 5 percent 
when the mflation rate IS 12 percent. Campbell found that mdustry qUIt rates are 
determmed by the real wage m the long run However, qUIts were found to re-
spond much more qUIckly to a change in mdustry wages than to a change m aggre-
gate wages or aggregate prIces, which means that nommal wages have a greater 
effect 011 qUIts m the short run In decIdmg how much effort to prOVIde, workers 
may SImIlarly respond more strongly to the real wage In the long run but to the 
nom mal wage In the short run. 
S. The exact wordIng of the questIOn was, "In recent years economIsts have 
developed several theones to explam why firms normally do not cut wages to the 
lowest level at wll1ch they can find the necessary number of qualIfied applIcants 
dUrIng a recession The questIons below are related to these varIOUS theones If 
your firm does not cut wages as low as pOSSIble durmg a recession, please IndIcate 
bow Important each of these theones IS m explainIng why you do not" 
Note that we asked about cuttlllg wages in a recession rather than about 
cuttmg wages m response to a fall in demand for the firm's output. CompetItIve 
theory predIcts that a firm's labor supply curve is a honzontallme at the market 
wage, so that wages will be ngid m response to a change m demand for a firm's 
output If the unemployment rate remams constant. However, standard competI-
tive theory offers no good explanation of why wages mIght be rigId III r!'sponse to 
a rIse III the aggregate unemployment rate 
SIX out of the 1S4 respondents dId not answer thIS questIOn One of these 
respondents wrote, "Cutting wages Just isn't the way to treat your workforce," 
another replIed, "Our rate of mcrease IS conSIstent WIth receSSIon," and a thIrd 
smd the questIOn was not applIcable. The other three respondents dId not explalll 
why they dId not answer the questIOn 
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Table IV reports the average score received by each of the 
statements for all firms and the average scores for Business Week 
(BW) and non-Business Week (NBW) firms.9 Cases where at-test 
indicates that the mean scores are significantly different (at the 
5 percent level) between occupational groups or between the van-
ous subsamples of firms (as discussed m Section II) are denoted 
with the notation at the bottom of the table. Also reported is the 
percentage of respondents who considered each explanation to be 
the most important factor. 
Many statements receIVed strong support, suggesting that 
the work of economists in recent years has not been completely 
misdirected. The statement receiving the highest score for all oc-
cupational groups was statement g, "If your firm were to cut 
wages, your most productive workers might leave, whereas if you 
layoff workers, you can layoff the least productive workers," as 
predicted by the adverse selection model as it applies to quits. 
In fact, in all but one case it received the highest score for all 
occupational groups in both the Busmess Week and non-Business 
Week subsamples. In the aggregate sample, t-tests indicate that 
its mean score is significantly higher (at the 5 percent level) than 
the mean score for any other statement for white-collar workers 
and for all but statement d (whIch deals with the effect of wages 
on effort) for blue-collar and less skilled workers. Furthermore, 
this statement always received the highest percentage of respon-
dents reporting this as the most important reason for not cutting 
wages in a recession, and it often outperformed the second 
ranked explanation by at least a 2 to 1 margin. IO 
Blinder and Choi [1990] and Bewley [1994,1995] did not find 
strong support for the adverse selection model in their studies. 11 
9 Two dIfferent verSIOns of the survey were sent to respondents, wIth the 
order of these statements diffenng between the two verSIOns. Out of 27 cases 
(mne statements times three occupational groups), the means were sIgmficantly 
dIfferent (at the 5 percent level) between the two verSIOns m only one case 
10 ConSIstent WIth these results, Gibbons and Katz [1991] found that the 
dIfference between the predisplacement and post dIsplacement earnmgs of whIte-
collar workers was SIgnIficantly greater for workers dIsplaced by layoffs than for 
workers dIsplaced by plant closmgs. They attnbuted thIS findmg to the fact that 
all workers, regardless of abIlIty, lose theIr Job m a plant closing, whereas a firm 
laymg off workers often has some dIscretion m whom to layoff. Thus, firms WIll 
generally layoff theIr least productive workers, and other firms WIll VIew thIS 
layoff as a negative SIgnal about the worker's unobserved abIlIty. No such negative 
sIgnal IS generated, however, when a firm closes an entIre plant 
11 On the other hand, some respondents m Agell and Lundborg's [1995] 
study mdicated that they mIght conSIder an indIvidual offenng to underbId ex-
Istmg workers as havmg infenor skills 
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TABLE IV 
AVERAGE SCORE RECEIVED FOR EACH STATEMENT (4 = VERY IMPORTANT, 3 = 
MODERATELY IMPORTANT, 2 = OF MINOR IMPORTANCE, 1 = NOT IMPORTANT) AND 
PEHCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS RATING EACH STATEMENT AS THE MOST IMPORTANT 
REASON (HANK IS IN PARENTHESES) 
Average score Percentage 
Non- rankmgeach 
Busmess Busmess statement as 
Overall Week Week most Important 
a Labor unIOn contracts 
prevent wages from bemg 
cut 
WhIte-collar" 135 1.32 1.39 47% 
(9) (9) (9) (7t) 
Blue-collar"'" 2.40 2.64 194 229% 
(7) (5) (9) (2) 
Less skllledu,I,' 2.05 2.29 1.64 132% 
(8t) (6) (9) (4) 
b, Workers dlshke 
unpredIctable changes III 
mcome Therefore, workers 
and firms reach an Imphclt 
understandmg that wages 
will neIther fall m recessions 
nor nse In expansIOns 
WhIte-collar" I 259 2.72 2.38 9.6% 
(5) (5) (5) (5) 
Blue-collar 2.79 276 2.85 117% 
(3) (3) (3t) (4t) 
Less skIlled 260 2.69 2.44 162% 
(3) (3) (5) (2) 
c. If your firm were to cut 
wages, people m the 
commumty would hear 
about It, makmg It more 
dIfficult to hIre workers m 
the future. 
Whlte-collarl 230 256 1.87 55% 
(7) (7) (8) (6) 
Bl ue-collarl 236 253 197 21% 
(8) (6) (8) (7t) 
Less skIliedl 220 247 171 34% 
(7) (5) (8) (7) 
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TABLEN 
(CONTINUED) 
Average score Percentage 
Non- rankIng each 
Busmess Busmess statement as 
Overall Week Week most Important 
d. A cut m wages would 
decrease workers' effort, 
resultmg m less output or 
poorer servIce 
WhIte-collar 2.77 277 277 103% 
(4) (4) (4) (4) 
Blue-collar* 2.99 294 3.12 154% 
(2) (2) (1) (3) 
Less skIlled 288 2.86 292 154% 
(2) (2) (2) (3) 
e A cut m wages would 
Increase number of workers 
who qwt, IncreaSIng the cost 
of hITIng and trammg new 
workers m the future 
WhIte-collar** 296 295 297 116% 
(2) (2) (2) (3) 
Blue-collar 273 268 285 117% 
(4) (4) (3t) (4t) 
Less skIlled' 256 256 2.55 9.4% 
(4) (4) (4) (5) 
f If your finn were to 
dIscharge some of Its current 
workers and to hIre new 
workers at a lower wage, the 
workers who remam would 
harass and refuse to 
cooperate wIth the newly 
hIred workers 
WhIte-collar 182 177 191 07% 
(8) (8) (7) (9) 
Blue-collar"" 2.16 220 209 1 1'70 
(9) (9) (7) (9) 
Less skIlled",' 205 2.11 194 17% 
(8t) (8) (7) (8t) 
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TABLE IV 
(CONTINUED) 
Average score Percentage 
Non- ranking each 
Business Busmess statement as 
Overall Week Week most Important 
g. If your firm were to cut 
wages, your most productIve 
workers mIght leave, 
whereas If you layoff 
workers, you can layoff the 
least productIve workers 
White-collar 3.27 335 3.13 408% 
(1) (1) (1) (1) 
Blue-collar 3.13 316 3.07 266% 
(1) (1) (2) (1) 
Less skIlledn " 3.10 313 3 04 346% 
(1) (1) (1) (1) 
h. Workers who have been 
wIth the firm for a long tIme 
have learned how the firm 
operates and have formed 
relationships WIth coworkers 
and clIents A cut m wages 
may cause some of your 
long-tIme employees to 
leave, and theIr 
replacements would not 
have this InSIde knowledge 
of the firm. 
WhIte-collar" .- 2.85 281 2.93 129% 
(3) (3) (3) (2) 
Blue-collar",m,' 2.50 2 35 2.82 64% 
(5) (8) (5) (6) 
Less skilled",m 2 24 2 05 2.57 3.8% 
(5) (9) (3) (6) 
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TABLE IV 
(CONTINUED) 
Average score Percentage 
Non- rankmg each 
BusIness BusIness statement as 
Overall Week Week most Important 
1 Independent of the effect 
of wage cuts on profits, 
people m management 
posItIons would be reluctant 
to cut wages m order to 
aVOId employees' resentment 
toward them. 
WhIte-collar"·I' 2.52 2.64 233 4.8% 
(6) (6) (6) (7t) 
Blue-collaru ' 248 2.50 244 2.1% 
(6) (7) (6) (7t) 
Less skIlledu 2.23 2.28 215 17% 
(6) (7) (6) (8t) 
uS1gmficantly greater (at the 5 percent level) for heavIly umomzed than for less umoD1.led finns 
nS1gmficantly gredter for less umomzed firms than fOl heaVIly umomzed firms 
lSlgmficantly greater for large finns than for small and ffildslzed firms 
omSlgmficantly greater for small and IDldslzed firms than for large firms 
"Slgmficantly greater for firms producmg servICes than for firms producmg goods 
'Slgmficantiy greater for thl<;; occupatIOnal group than for the group recelVmg the lowest average score 
"Slgmficantlj greater for thlS occupahonal group than for both other occupatIOnal groups 
However, their studies considered adverse selectlOn as it applies 
to new hires, while our study considers adverse selection as it 
applies to qUltS. I2 Thus, while there does not appear to be a 
strong correlation between workers' productivity and their reser-
vation wage, workers' productivity does appear to be correlated 
with their propensity to quit. 
For white-collar workers, strong support was also found for 
the hypothesis that firms keep wages rigid because they fear a 
cut in wages would increase the number of quits. Both e, which 
deals with the explicit cost of hiring and training replacements if 
workers quit, and h, which deals with the loss of firm-specific hu-
man capital if workers quit, received strong support for these 
workers. Interestingly, models involving explicit costs of hiring 
12 In fact, Blmder and ChOI [1990, P 1007] state, "We VIew [these findings] 
as damagmg eVIdence agamst the adverse-selectIOn model. unless . adverse 
selectIon apphes only to qUIts, not to new hIres" 
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and training new workers have received much more attention 
from economists than models involving the loss of firm-specific 
human capital, although our survey finds almost as much sup-
port for firm-specific human capital as for hiring and training 
costs. Also receiving reasonably strong support for white-collar 
workers is statement d, "A cut in wages would decrease workers' 
effort, resulting in less output or poorer service." 
For blue-collar and less skilled workers, strong support was 
found for explanations in which wages affect effort and for im-
plicit contract theory, as evidenced by the scores for statements d 
and b. In addition, hiring and training costs appear to be a rea-
sonably important factor in explaining wage rigidity for blue-
collar and less skilled workers, although less of a factor than for 
white-collar workers. 
Note that theories involving the effect of wages on quits do a 
better job of explaining the rigidity of white-collar wages, while 
theories emphasizing the effect of wages on effort are better at 
explaining wage rigidity for blue-collar and less skilled workers. 
There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, 
white-collar workers perform jobs that are more challenging and 
less standardized between firms, making hiring and training 
costs higher for white-collar workers than for other workers and 
making the productivity of white-collar workers more dependent 
on their tenure with the firm. Second, Agell and Lundborg [1995] 
found that white-collar workers are more likely to quit than to 
reduce their effort in response to a wage cut, while a wage cut 
would affect both effort and quits for blue-collar workers. Third, 
the results elsewhere in this study indicate that the effort of 
white-collar workers is less responsive to a cut in wages than is 
the effort of other workers. 
The other explanations received less support than the ones 
discussed above in explaining wage rigidity. Moderate support 
was found for statement c, which deals with the effect of wage 
cuts on the firm's reputation and thus on its ability to hire work-
ers in the future. Moderate support was also found for statement 
1, which was included to account for the possibility that keeping 
wages rigid does not maximize profits but instead results from 
the desire of individuals responsible for setting wages to avoid 
resentment directed at them. The fact that statement i received 
lower scores than most of the other statements suggests that not 
cutting wages in an economic downturn is profit-maximizing be-
havior for most firms. 
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Explanations based on contract theory and insider-outsider 
theory received weak support, as evidenced by the scores for 
statements a and f. Both these statements, however, received 
much stronger support in firms that are more than 30 percent 
unionized. In these firms, statement a received average scores of 
3.81 for blue-collar workers and 3.61 for less skilled workers, and 
statement f received average scores of 2.65 for blue-collar work-
ers and 2.70 for less skilled workers. In additIOn, responses to 
questions elsewhere in the survey (whIch are not reported, but 
are available upon request) suggest that insider-outsIder theory 
has much greater power to explain the behavior of union workers 
than of nonunion workers. However, a less literal interpretation 
of insider-outsider theory may have more power to explain the 
wage-setting process for nonunion workers. While these workers 
may not explicitly harass or refuse to cooperate with new en-
trants, they may reduce their productivity in more subtle ways, 
such as slowmg down the speed at which they tram them. In ad-
dition, incumbent workers may choose to provide less effort when 
their former coworkers are replaced by new entrants hired at a 
lower wage. 
In comparing the average scores between the different sub-
samples offirms, we found similar averages for many statements. 
In some cases, however, we found sIgnificant differences. The 
reputational effects of a wage cut did substantially better at ex-
plaining wage rigidity for large firms than for small firms, proba-
bly because the actions of larger firms receive greater publicity. 
Firm-specific human capital received higher scores at smaller 
firms than at large firms and higher scores at firms producing 
servIces than at firms producing goods. A plausible explanation 
for these findmgs is that jobs are less standardized between firms 
in service-producing industries than in goods-producing indus-
tries and are less standardized in small firms than in large firms, 
making workers' productivity more dependent on their tenure 
with the firm.13 
13 The responses to the statements m Table IV and to the questlOns in the 
rest of the survey were regressed on the firm's SIze, the firm's umomzatlOn rate, 
and mdustry dummy vanables A list of cases m whIch these vanables are Slg-
mficant at the 5 percent level IS aVailable from the authors upon request 
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SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS 
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In this section we report the responses to questions that ad-
dress the assumptions of the explanations receiving the strongest 
support in Table IV. 14 However, we do not deal with the assump-
tions of models involving turnover costs and the loss of firm-
specific human capital, since the effect of wages on quits, a key 
component of these models, can be measured empirically.15 
A The Effect of Wages on Effort 
Strong support was found in Table IV for the idea that firms 
fear a wage cut would reduce their workers' effort. While adverse 
selection received the strongest support from survey participants, 
we discuss the effect of wages on effort first, because the discus-
sion of adverse selection draws on the responses to questions in 
this subsection. ThIS subsection considers the reasons why wages 
may affect workers' effort and the nature of the relationship be-
tween wages and effort. 
Economists have suggested several possible reasons why ef-
fort may depend on wages. In Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] a higher 
wage raises the cost of job loss, thereby inducing fewer workers 
to shirk. In the gift-exchange models of Akerlof [1982, 1984] and 
the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen [1990], work-
ers' effort depends on their gratitude and loyalty to the firm, 
which, in turn, depends on their wage. Gift-exchange theory and 
fair wage theory differ slightly in that effort depends on the firm's 
wage relative to workers' outside opportunities in the former, and 
depends on the firm's wage relative to workers' perceived fair 
wage in the latter,16 but they will be considered as a single expla-
nation in this study. 
To ascertain whether respondents viewed shirking or grati-
tude and fairness as more relevant in explaining why a cut in 
wages would reduce effort, we posed the following question to re-
spondents who previously indicated that effort would fall if wages 
were cut:17 
14 A summary of the questIOns and responses that are not reported m thIS 
study is avaIlable from the authors upon request. 
15. See, for example, Campbell [1993, 1995a, 1995b] 
16. Several factors, such as the profitabIlIty of the firm, wages of other work-
ers at the same firm, and past wages, have no effect on workers' outsIde opportum-
ties but may affect their perceIved falr wage 
17. The order of the questIOns on the survey was dIfferent from the order m 
whIch they are presented m thIS study 
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1. Economists have discussed two reasons why cuttmg wages 
might lower workers' effort. One is that workers will feel less 
gratitude and loyalty to the firm and will not work as hard in 
return. A second is that workers who are paId less will be less 
concerned about losing their jobs and thus will not work as hard. 
Which reason bests explains why effort would fall If you were to 
cut wages? 
Overall BW NBW 
Gratitude and loyalty 69.2% 79.2% 51.7% 
Less concern about 
job loss 4.4% 1.0% 10.3% 
Both reasons about 
equally important 26.4% 19.8% 37.9% 
It thus appears that the relationship between wages and effort is 
more a function of a wage cut's effect on workers' morale than of 
its effect on the cost of shirking. To further explore the lmpor-
tance of shirking, Question 2 asked respondents to rank in order 
of importance three of five factors that may be important in keep-
mg workers from shirking. Reported are average scores calcu-
lated by assigning 5 points for a first place rank, 4 points for a 
second place rank, and 3 points for a third place rank. Also re-
ported is the percentage of respondents ranking each response as 
the most important factor: 
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2. Below is a list of some things that economists believe may be 
important in keeping workers from slacking off on the job. 
a. high unemployment 
b. high wages 
c. good management-worker relationships 
d. good working conditions 
e. close supervision by supervisors 
Please indicate below which of these factors are the most im-
portant in keeping your workers from slacking off on the job. 
% respondmg most 
Average score Important 
WC BC LS WC BC LS 
HIgh unemployment 1.27 121 1.23 9.7% 10.1% 88% 
HIgh wages 2.92 310 2.77 133% 25.7% 25.5% 
Good management-
worker relatIOnshIps 4.39 3.96 3.58 661% 46.8% 43.8% 
Good working 
condItions 2.82 2.74 257 91% 147% 10.2% 
Close superVISIOn by 
superVIsors 0.53 086 167 1.8% 2.8% 11.7% 
High wages ranked well behind good management-worker rela-
tionships for all groups of workers. In addition, high unemploy-
ment and close supervision, two factors also emphasized by the 
shirking literature, were given low ranks by respondents. The re-
sponses to Questions 1 and 2 suggest that the fear of job loss is 
not the primary reason why wages affect effort. Consistent with 
our results, Blinder and Choi [1990] and Bewley [1994, 1995] 
found little support for the shirking model, and Agell and Lund-
borg [1995] found that shirking is not very common and that most 
shirkers are not dismissed. The poor performance of the shirking 
model in this and other surveys is noteworthy, since the shirking 
model has probably received the most attention of the models in 
the efficiency wage literature. 
The responses to other questions in our survey also demon-
strate that firms view workers' perception of fairness as signifi-
cantly affecting their effort. The following question, asked of 
respondents who previously indicated that a wage cut would re-
duce workers' effort, illustrates the importance of the firm's 
profitability on workers' perceived fair wage: 
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3. Again, supposing that wages were cut by 10%, do you think the 
amount that workers' effort would decrease would be different if 
workers believed the firm were losing money than if workers be-
lieved the firm were highly profitable? 
WhIte-collar Blue-collar Less skIlled 
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW 
A great deal 660% 618% 750% 510% 487% 571% 328% 360% 262% 
A moderate 
amount 220% 255% 146% 346% 368% 286% 383% 360% 429% 
To a mlnor 
degree 53% 69% 21% 96% 105% 71% 172% 221'* 71% 
No 67% 59% 83% 48% 39% 71% 11 7% 58% 238% 
The effect of profits on workers' perceived fair wage can explain 
why previous research has found that the profitability of a firm 
is a significant determinant of its wages. I8 One should note, how-
ever, that another possible reason why a wage cut would have a 
smaller effect on effort at a firm losing money is that workers at 
such a firm would be more worried about losing their jobs. 
Another determinant of a worker's perceived fair wage ap-
pears to be the wages of other workers at the same firm, as illus-
trated by the responses to Questions 4 and 5: 
4. Suppose your firm mcreased the wages of your better paId 
workers without raising the wages of workers who are paid less. 
Do you feel this would have an adverse effect on the effort and 
morale of the workers receiving lower wages? 
Overall BW NBW 
A great deal 50.6% 52.8% 47.2% 
A moderate amount 35.0% 38.0% 30.6% 
A small amount 10.8% 7.9% 15.3% 
No 3.6% 1.4% 6.9% 
18 Th,s Issue IS d,scussed at length III Carruth and Oswald [1989], wh,ch 
summanzes the results of past research and presents new results 
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5. Suppose your firm increased the wages of your workers who 
are paid less without raising the wages of your better paid work-
ers. Do you feel this would have an adverse effect on the effort 
and morale of the workers receiving higher wages? 
Overall BW NBW 
A great deal 33.9% 32.4% 36.1% 
A moderate amount 36.1% 42.6% 26.4% 
A small amount 21.9% 19.9% 25.0% 
No 8.1% 5.1% 12.5% 
It thus appears that workers compare their wage with the wages 
of workers paid both more than themselves and less than them-
selves, but that they view the wages of workers paid more than 
themselves as the more relevant comparison.19 
The president of a small manufacturing company provided 
us with anecdotal evidence of how a worker's perception of his 
fair wage may affect his attitude. An employee at his firm was 
satisfied with his job and with the salary he was earning. Then 
one day he saw an incoming fax containing the salaries of other 
members of his department, and he discovered that some of his 
coworkers were earning considerably more than himself. After 
seeing this fax, he became dissatisfied with his salary, and his 
morale noticeably worsened. 
We next examine the relationship between wages and effort, 
because this relationship may play an important role in the wage-
setting behavior of firms. Three key issues are how much a 
change in wages will affect effort, whether workers respond dif-
ferently to wage cuts than to wage increases, and whether effort 
is more related to wage levels or wage changes. 
To investigate the degree to which wages affect effort and the 
possibility of asymmetries in this effect, we asked respondents 
the following questions:20 
19 Akerlof and Yellen [1990] report the findmgs of an experiment perfonned 
by Martm [1981], in whIch technicIans were asked whose pay they would most 
lIke to know for a companson WIth theIr own pay the hIghest or lowest pay of 
techmcIans or the hIghest, average, or lowest pay of supervIsors Most respon-
dents answered that they would be most interested m knowmg the pay of the 
hIghest level of technicians If a firm faces a shock that lowers the demand for 
some workers but not the demand for other workers, workers' concerns about 
relatIve wages wIthm the finn can explam wage ngidIty for the first group of 
workers 
20 In half of the surveys, QuestIon 7 appeared before Question 6 The aver-
age responses were not sIgnificantly different between the two verSIOns of the 
survey 
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6. Suppose you were to cut wages by 10%. By approximately what 
percentage (if at all) would you expect workers' effort to fall as a 
result of this cut in wages? 
WhIte-collar Blue-collar Less skIlled 
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW 
Mean 154% 150% 169% 194% 193% 198% 227% 211% 277% 
MedIan 10.0% 100% 150% 150% 150% 200% 200% 180% 200% 
>0% 858% 895% 720% 920% 957% 765% 913% 937% 840% 
2:10% 61.7% 616% 640% 747% 771% 647% 788% 785% 800% 
7. Suppose you were to raise wages by 10%. By approximately 
what percentage (if at all) would you expect workers' effort to rise 
as a result ofthe wage increase? 
WhIte-collar Blue-collar Less skIlled 
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW 
Mean 6.6% 65% 71% 64% 67% 52% 69% 62% 89% 
MedIan 25% 22% 375% 175% 00% 50% 10% 00% 25% 
>0% 558% 545% 607% 521% 467% 714% 532% 464% 741% 
~10% 194% 188% 214% 187% 187% 190% 225% 190% 333% 
Respondents expected that the effect of wages on effort would be 
strongly asymmetric. On the downward side a substantial major-
ity of respondents believed that a 10 percent wage cut would de-
crease effort by at least 10 percent. In addition, their responses 
indicated that they believed the effort of less skilled workers 
would be the most affected by a wage cut, while the effort of 
white-collar workers would be the least affected. A possible expla-
nation for this finding IS that workers performing jobs that re-
quire greater skill are motivated more by the challenge and 
enjoyment of their work than by their wage. 
On the upward side, only about one-fifth of the respondents 
felt that a 10 percent wage increase would raise workers' effort 
by at least 10 percent, close to half the respondents felt that a 10 
percent wage increase would have no effect on effort, and the me-
dian responses were close to zero While the mean responses were 
greater than the median responses, the means were greatly af-
fected by the presence of a few outliers.21 Nine respondents who 
expected a wage increase to raise effort volunteered that the rise 
in effort would be only temporary. Since the survey did not ask 
whether the increase would be permanent or temporary, the fact 
21 FIve mdIV1duals gave responses between 50 percent and 100 percent. 
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that nine respondents made this comment is noteworthy. A plau-
sible explanation for the large asymmetries between a wage in-
crease and a wage decrease is that workers view wage cuts as 
unfair and that people value losses much more than they value 
equivalent gains, a psychological phenomenon supported by re-
search discussed in Knetsch [1995]. 
Question 8 asked respondents to compare the effect of the 
level of the wage with the effect of a decrease in the wage: 
8. Consider the following two situations: 
A. Assume that for the past five years, you paid wages that 
were 10% lower than the wages you actually paid. (For 
example, if your firm paid wages of $10/hour from 1990 
to 1994, assume that you instead paid wages of $9/hour 
from 1990 to 1994.) 
B. Assume that for the previous four years, you had paid the 
same wages that you actually paid, and then cut wages 
by 10% in the current year. (For example, if your firm 
paid wages of $10/hour from 1990 to 1994, assume that 
you paid wages of $10/hour from 1990 to 1993, but then 
cut wages to $9/hour in 1994.) 
In which situation would you expect workers' effort and morale 
















The overwhelming majority of respondents expected that work-
ers' effort and morale would be worse if their firm cut wages than 
if their firm had paid lower wages for the past five years. In both 
cases it was assumed that the current wage was 10 percent below 
its actual level. The fact that workers appear to respond more 
strongly to a wage cut than to low wages, per se, suggests that 
the ratio of a worker's current wage to his or her past wage is an 
important determinant of the worker's effort. This finding corrob-
orates the work of Bewley [1994, 1995], who found that respon-
dents reported a much stronger relationship between workers' 
morale and wage decreases than between workers' morale and 
wage levels, and it supports the statement of Kahneman, 
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Knetsch, and Thaler [1986, p. 730] that "the current wage of an 
employee serves as reference for evaluating the fairness of future 
adjustments of that employee's wage." 
Overall, firms appear to believe that wages have a strong ef-
fect on effort by affecting workers' attitudes toward their em-
ployer. And it is possIble that even a small change m effort could 
have a large effect on profits at firms that are more technically 
advanced, giving these firms a strong incentIve to pay wages that 
are perceived as fair. The results of this survey also suggest that 
the molding of workers' attitudes is a complex process, with past 
wages, the firm's profits, and wages of other workers at the same 
firm all being Important factors in a worker's perception of 
fmrness. 
B. Adverse Selectwn 
The strongest support in Table IV was found for adverse se-
lection as it pertains to quits, implymg that productivity and quit 
propensity are positIvely correlated. Note that these will be POSI-
tIVely correlated only if firms do not pay wages that are equal to 
workers' productivity. (OtherWIse, firms would be indifferent 
about which workers quit and whIch workers they layoff.) To ex-
plore the propOSItIon that wage differentials are smaller than 
productivity differentials, Question 9 presented the following 
scenario: 
9. Suppose you had two employees working together, with identi-
cal ages, working experIence, and educations. But suppose that 
employee A were 20% more productive than employee B. How 
much more do you think you would pay employee A relative to 
employee B? [Respondents were given a range of pay dIfferen-
tials, and we converted these into a single number, usmg the mid-
pomts of the ranges. 22] 
WhIte-collar Blue-collar Less skIlled 
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW 
12.2% 11.5% 13.6% 8.9% 8.3% 10.2% 8.8% 7 5'10 11.1% 
22 The ranges were 0 percent, 1-7 percent, 8-14 percent. 15-19 percent, 20 
percent, and more than 20 percent We converted these ranges to 0 percent, 4 
percent, 11 percent, 17 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent The percentage of 
re"ponses lymg wlthm each range (from lowest to hIghest) was 3 1 percent, 20 8 
percent, 42 9 percent, 12 1 percent, 12 7 percent, and 8.4 percent for whIte-collar 
workers, 21 8 percent, 25 5 percent, 28.2 percent, 11 8 percent, 8 2 percent, and 
4 5 percent for blue-collar workers; and 22 0 percent, 26 5 percent, 28 0 percent, 
5 6 percent, 15.7 percent, and 2 2 percent for less skIlled workers 
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On average, respondents indicated that the pay differential 
would equal only about half the differential in productivity. In 
some cases respondents were asked why they would not pay the 
more productive worker 20 percent more, and the answer most 
often given was that a large pay differential would be bad for 
morale.21 Note that keeping wage differentials smaller than pro-
ductivity differentials is optimal behavior for firms only if work-
ers care more about the wages of workers paid more than 
themselves than of workers paid less than themselves, a proposi-
tion supported by our previous results. 
One objection that may be raised concerning adverse selec-
tion in quits as an explanation for wage rigidity is that firms 
could cut wages for only less productive workers and leave the 
wages of the more productive workers unchanged. However, as 
discussed above, workers appear to be particularly sensitive to 
changes in the wage distribution within the firm, so that such a 
policy could reduce the effort of less productive workers much 
more than an across-the-board cut in wages would reduce their 
effort. 
Another possible objection is that an aggregate shock should 
affect wages at all firms equally, so that a worker's outside mar-
ket opportunities should move one-for-one with the wage at his 
or her current firm. If this occurs, there would be no incentive for 
a firm's most productive workers to quit in response to a cut in 
wages that results from an aggregate shock. However, our previ-
ous results suggest that workers react strongly to behavior they 
consider unfair. Workers who know that they could earn more at 
another firm, but who would normally prefer to remain at their 
present firm because of the nonpecuniary benefits they derive 
from working there, may decide to leave their present firm iftheir 
wages are cut. In addition, if workers are uncertain about wages 
at other firms, a cut in wages may provide the incentive for them 
to undertake the cost of exploring outside opportunities.24 
23 Conslstent with the answers of our respondents, Frank [1984] exammed 
the wages and producbvitles of sales workers and univerSIty professors and con-
cluded that the most productIve workers are paid less than theIr marginal prod-
ucts, while the least productive workers are paId more than theIr margmal 
products In additIOn, Bewley [1994, 1995] found that firms generally do not hire 
new workers at wages substantially below the wages of theIr current employees 
because firms fear that the new workers would resent being paId less than work-
ers hIred earher, adversely affectmg theIr morale and loyalty to the firm. 
24 ConSIstent WIth the propOSItIon that workers have greater knowledge of 
their own wage than of aggregate wages, Campbell [1995a] found that the qUit 
rates of workers m an mdustry respond WIth a much shorter lag to mdustry wages 
than to aggregate wages. 
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C. Implic~t Contract Theory 
In implicit contract models, workers are risk-averse and pre-
fer a stable wage to one that varies over the business cycle, so 
that a firm offering a stable wage could on average pay a lower 
wage than a firm that always paid a wage equal to workers' mar-
ginal revenue product. Therefore, firms and workers reach an im-
plicit understanding that wages will remam stable, even though 
workers' marginal revenue product may vary. The average scores 
received for statement b in Table IV and the responses in this 
subsection show reasonably strong support among survey respon-
dents for implicit contracts in explaining wage rigidity. 
The responses to the following question suggest that firms 
believe workers prefer stable wages to varying wages: 
10. Suppose your firm had a policy of cutting wages m a receSSIOn 
and raising wages in an economic expansion, but on average you 
paid the same wage as you currently do. Do you think it would 
be more difficult to attract new applicants to the firm than with 
your current policies? 
WhIte-collar Blue-collar Less sktlled 
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW 
No 128% 95% 186% 134% 143% 114% 224% 239ck, 191% 
Somewhat 
more dIfficult 146% 152% 136% 125'7c 156% 57% 157% 170% 149% 
Moderately 
more dIfficult 213% 219% 203% 232% 247% 200% 201% 216'1c 170% 
Much more 
dIfficult 512% 533% 475% 509'7{ 455'7c 629'70 418% 375% 489% 
However, some caution should be used in interpreting these results 
as evidence that workers are risk-averse, as another possible rea-
son why firms paying varying wages would have more trouble in 
attracting workers is that workers view wage cuts as unfair. 
There are two basic problems with implicit contract theory 
The first is that workers receiving a stable wage will face a 
greater chance of unemployment during a recession. Why then 
would implicIt contracts specify a stable wage instead of stable 
employment? One possible reason is that workers prefer a stable 
wage to stable employment prospects since a worker whose wage 
is cut receives no benefits, whereas an unemployed worker may 
25 Note that the total compensatIon of workers WIll be hIgher If a firm lays 
off workers than If It cuts wages or cuts the hours of every worker, smce laId-
off workers are elIgible for unemployment compensatIon, whereas workers whose 
wages or hours are cut are not ebgIble. 
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receive unemployment compensation,25 time to look for a new job, 
and leisure time. To determine what firms believe about workers' 
preferences, we asked the following question: 
11. Suppose the economy were in a recession and you gave your 
workers the following choice: 
A. a 10% wage cut 
B. a 10% chance of losing their jobs and a 90% chance of 
remaining with your firm with no pay cut. 
Which do you think most of your employees would choose? 
Wh,te-collar Blue-collar Less skllled 
Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW Overall BW NBW 
10% wage cut 428% 381% 508% 407% 392% 441% 404% 379% 449% 
10% chance 
oflosmgJoh 404% 429% 361% 381% 354% 441% 397% 322% 531% 
Not sure 169% 190% 131% 212% 253% 118% 199% 299% 20% 
On this issue respondents were split almost down the middle. 
Thus, a sizable number of respondents did view workers as pre-
ferring employment cuts to wage cuts. 
Another reason why workers may prefer a stable wage to sta-
ble employment prospects is asymmetric information between 
firms and workers. This asymmetric information means that im-
plicit contracts giving firms greater latitude in setting the wage 
than in setting the level of employment might give employers an 
incentive to falsely claim that product demand is weak. Thus, 
employment cuts may be needed to prove to workers that demand 
for the firm's output has actually fallen, in order to make them 
more accepting of wage cuts. The following question asked re-
spondents about the plausibility of this idea: 
12. Some economists have claimed that if firms cut wages more 
and employment less in a recessIOn, then workers would not be-
lieve that demand for the firm's product or service has really 
fallen. Thus, employment cuts are needed to make workers more 
accepting of wage cuts. How plausible does this seem to you? 
Employ. Employ. Goods- Serv,ce-
Overall BW NBW 2- 1000 <1000 producmg producmg 
Very 11.5% 5.0% 205% 5.6% 212% 50% 149% 
Moderately 28.4% 30.7% 25.3% 306% 250% 267% 29.4% 
To a small 
degree 26.7% 297% 22.6% 29.6% 22.0% 35.0% 224% 
Not very 33.3% 34.7% 31.5% 343% 31.8% 33.3% 333% 
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This idea was viewed as moderately or very plausIble by 39.9 per-
cent of the respondents. Particularly interesting is the difference 
between firms on this issue, with service-producing firms finding 
this idea more plausible than goods-producing firms and smaller 
firms finding this idea more plausible than large firms. The dif-
ference between goods-producing and service-producing firms is 
probably explained by the fact that the output of goods-producmg 
firms is more tangible so that workers in these firms have a more 
accurate idea of the demand for the firm's product. As the presi-
dent of a manufacturing firm told us, "our workers know how 
much of our product they're shipping." The difference between 
larger firms and smaller firms may result from the fact that a 
greater proportion of shocks to smaller firms are idiosyncratic, so 
that aggregate economic data provide less information about the 
demand for the output of these firms. 
A second problem with implicit contract models is that im-
plicit contracts are not, by nature, legally binding. However, 
economists have proposed two mechanisms that may give firms 
an incentive not to violate an implicit contract: a firm that cuts 
wages in a recession will experience a decrease in effort by its 
current workers and will acquire a negative reputation, making 
it more difficult to hire workers in the future. 26 The responses in 
Table IV suggest that firms view the effect of a wage cut on the 
effort of current workers as a much greater deterrent than the 
effect of a wage cut on the firm's reputatIOn. While this motive 
appears to be similar to firms' motive for not cuttmg wages in 
fair wage models, there is an important difference between these 
explanations. Fair wage theory suggests that wage cuts reduce 
effort because workers VIew a wage cut as unfair by its very na-
ture, while implicit contract theory suggests that wage cuts re-
duce effort because workers view a wage cut as a violation of an 
implicit understanding between their employer and themselves. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The most important results of this study are the strong sup-
port found for two explanations of wage rigidity: adverse selection 
as it applies to qUItS and the dependence of effort on wages. When 
respondents were asked to assess the importance of various 
26 See Azanadls and Shghtz [19831, Hart [19831, and StIgiltz [1986] for dIS-
cussions of thIS Issue 
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statements in explaining why they normally do not cut wages as 
low as possible in a recession, the response receiving the highest 
score for all three occupational groups was that a firm cutting 
wages would probably lose its most productive workers, whereas 
a firm laying off workers can layoff its least productive workers. 
Respondents also gave high scores to the effect of wages on 
effort as an explanation for wage rigidity. This effect appears to be 
particularly strong when workers feel that they are being 
paid less than their fair wage. Many factors appear to affect a 
worker's perception of the fairness of his or her pay, including the 
worker's past wages, the profitability of the firm, the wages 
of workers performing similar Jobs at the firm, and the wages of 
workers in different occupations at the firm. Given the complexi-
ties involved with the concept of fairness, incorporating fairness 
into models of wage-setting will be a difficult task. 
Workers' concerns about fairness can explain why the ad-
verse selection model provides such a strong explanation for wage 
rigidity. Most firms appear to keep wage differentials between 
workers smaller than productivity differentials because they are 
concerned that large wage differentials for similar workers would 
be harmful to morale. Since wages are not equal to productivity, 
firms would rather layoff their least productive workers than 
lose their most productive workers through quits. 
Strong support was also found for explanations in which 
wages affect the number of workers who quit, particularly for 
white-collar workers. While most previous research on the effect 
of labor turnover on a firm's wage policy has concentrated on the 
explicit costs of hiring and training new workers, this study re-
veals that firms fear the loss of firm-specific human capital when 
experienced workers quit almost as much as they fear the cost of 
hiring and training replacements. 
Implicit contract theory emerged as a reasonable explanation 
for wage rigidity, as many respondents indicated that an implicit 
understanding with workers to keep wages stable over the busi-
ness cycle is an important reason for not cutting wages in a reces-
sion. Our results reveal that firms' greatest incentive for not 
breaking an implicit contract is their fear that workers would 
provide less effort rather than their concern for their reputation. 
A literal interpretation of insider-outsider theory appears to 
have more power to explain wage-setting behavior in heavily un-
ionized firms than in firms in which unionization rates are lower. 
It thus might be a better explanation for unemployment in Euro-
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pean countries, where unionization rates are typically much 
higher than in the United States. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that simllar results were 
found wlth the Business Week and non-Business Week subsam-
pIes, even though these subsamples were obtained quite differ-
ently. In addition, the conclusions of this study are similar to the 
conclusions of other studies, even though these studies have dif-
fered greatly in their sampling techniques, sample size, indus-
trial compositIOn of firms, and style of question. All surveys of 
wage rigidity have found that concerns for fairness play an im-
portant role in explaining why firms normally refrain from cut-
ting wages in recessionary periods. In addition, surveys that have 
exammed the issue of turnover costs have found strong support 
for explanatIOns emphasizing workers' quit behavior. Consistent 
with the results of the present study, past studles have found lit-
tle support for explanatIOns emphasizing shirking in explaining 
wage rigidity. There lS some disagreement as to the importance 
of adverse selectIOn, although the studies that found evidence 
against it exammed adverse selection as it relates to new hires, 
not to quits. The fact that such similar conclusions have been 
reached by recent surveys, which have used different sample 
populations and have asked different questions, should give us 
confidence in accepting these conclusions as valid explanations of 
wage ngidity. 
ApPENDIX 
Respondents for the present study were obtamed from sev-
eral sources. Most of the respondents were compensation profes-
sIOnals at Business Week 1000 firms who were listed in the 
American Compensation Association's Membership Directory. 
This sample is similar to that used in Levine [1993]. As in Levine, 
if a company had more than one compensation officer, the survey 
was sent to the one whom we perceived to be the highest ranking 
Surveys were sent to 584 compensation professionals from Busi-
ness Week 1000 companies (the remaining firms had no compen-
sation personnel listed in the ACA's MembershIp Directory), and 
111 surveys were returned, for a response rate of 19 0 percent.27 
27 The response rate to Levme's [1993] survey was over 40 percent A pos-
SIble reason why the response rate to our survey was lower than the response 
rate to h,S survey was that our survey was consIderably longer 
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Since the Business Week firms are all large, they may not 
be representative of all firms in the economy. In addition, some 
industries (e.g., construction and wholesale and retaIl trade) are 
underrepresented in a sample oflarger firms and other industries 
(e.g., manufacturing, public utilities, and finance) are overrepre-
sented. This means that the composition of firms in the Business 
Week 1000 will differ from the industrial composition of the 
U. S. economy. 
Thus, we also wanted to include some small and midsized 
firms in our study. In addition to making the sample more repre-
sentative of the U. S. economy, including smaller firms in the 
study also allows us to investigate whether the reasons for wage 
rigidity differ between firms of different sizes. We used several 
sources to obtain small and midsized companies. One important 
source was alumni of Colgate University28 in professional and 
managerial positions in the San Francisco, Miami, and Columbus 
areas. These alumni were contacted by the authors, and the ones 
willing to assist with our project put us in contact with the person 
or department responsible for setting wages. Surveys were 
mailed to the individuals who were willing to participate. Approx-
imately 20 percent of our initial contacts resulted in a decision 
not to participate by either the alumnus or the individual respon-
sible for the firm's wage policy. Of the 72 surveys that were 
mailed to individuals who agreed to partIcipate, 32 were re-
turned, for a response rate of 44 percent. 
The remaining firms for the non-Business Week sample were 
obtained from several areas. The authors personally interviewed 
or mailed surveys to individuals responsible for setting wages in 
firms in the Des Moines, Manhattan, Long Island, central New 
York, and Philadelphia areas. We obtained these firms from per-
sonal contacts, friends and relatives, and calls to some local firms. 
Note that this method was similar to that used by Bewley [1994, 
1995]. The response rate was over 75 percent for firms we 
approached. 
Note that the non-Business Week firms are not a random 
sample of all small to midsized firms in the economy, since all the 
respondents were located in certain geographical areas or had 
some connection to the authors or to Colgate University. Because 
of the sampling issues, the non-Business Week subs ample is 
28. Campbell was a professor, and Kamlam was a student at Colgate Univer-
SIty at the tIme the survey was conducted 
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probably less representative of small and mIdsized firms than the 
Business Week subsample is of large firms However, the non-
Business Week subsample was obtained from several dIfferent 
sources, and It IS likely that biases in the responses would not be 
significantly correlated between these different sources. 
The Business Week firms were surveyed in the summer and 
fall of 1994, and most of the non-Business Week firms were sur-
veyed in the summer of 1993 and the fall of 1994. Overall, our 
survey included 184 firms in 53 different two-digit SIC industries 




Agell, Jonas, and Per Lundborg, "Theones of Pay and Unemplo)ment Survey 
EVldence from Swedlsh Manufacturing FIrms," Scandmaman JOIl! nal of Eco-
nomiCS, XCVII (1995), 295-307 
Akerlof, George A , "Labor Contracts as Partlal Glft Exchange," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, XCVII (1982), 543-69 
~-, "Gift Exchange and Efficlency-Wage Theory Four Views," Amencan Eco-
nomic ReVIew, LXXIV (1984), 79--83 
Akerlof George A, and Janet L Yellen, "The Falr Wage-Effort Hypothesls and 
Unemployment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CV (1990),255-83 
Azanadls, Costas, "Imphclt Contracts and Underemployment Eqmhbna," Jour-
nal of Politl('(fl Economy, LXXXIII (1975),1183--1202 
Azanadls, Costas, and Joseph E Shght7, "lmphclt Contracts and Flxed Pnce 
Eqmhbna," Quartelly Journal of Economics, XCVIII (1983),1-22 
Bally, Martlll Nell, "Wages and Employment under Uncertam Demand," Revlew 
of Economlc Studles, XLI (1974), 37--50 
Bewley, Truman F , "A Fleld Study on Downward Wage Rlgidlty," paper presented 
at the NBER workshop on BehaViOral Macroeconomlcs, 1991 
~-, "Depressed Labor Markets as Explallled by Partlcipants," American Eco-
nomic Revlew, LXXXV (1995), 250-54 
Blmder, Alan S , "Why Are Prices StIcky? Prehmlllary Results from an Intervlew 
Study," Amencan Economic ReVieW, LXXXI (1991), 89-96 
Bhnder, Alan S" and Don H ChOl, "A Shred of EVldence on Theones of Wage 
Shcluness," Quarterly ,Journal of Economlcs, CV (1990), 1003-15 
Campbell, Carl M , "Do Flnns Pay EffiCIency Wages? EVIdence WIth Data at the 
Flrm Level," Journal of Labor Ewnomlcs, XI (1993), 442-70 
~-, "A Cross-Industry TIme-Senes Analysls of Qmts," Quarterly ReView of Eco-
nomzcs and Fmance, XXXV (1995a), 53-72 
--, "The Relatwe Impacts of the Level and Change m Wages on Qmts," Inierna-
twnal .Journal of Manpower, XVI (1995b), 31-41 
Card, Davld, and Dean Hyslop, "Does InflatIOn 'Grease the "'-'beels of the LabOl 
Market'?' NBER Workmg Paper No 5538, Apnl 1996 
Carruth, AlanA, and Andrew J Oswald, Pay Detenwnrxtwn and Industlw[ Pros-
peltty (OxfUld Oxford Ulllverslty Press, 1989) 
FIscher, Stanley, "Long-Term Contracts, RatIonal ExpectatIOns, and the Optlmal 
Money Supply Rule," Journal nf PolitIcal Economy, LXXXV (1977) 191-206 
Frank, Robert H, "Are Workers Pmd thelr MargInal Products?" Amerzcan E(o-
nomlC Revzew, LXXIV (1984), 549-71 
Glbbons, Robmt, and Lawrence F Katz, "Layoffs and Lemons," JOllrnal of Labo/' 
EconO/1Ucs, IX (1991), 351-80 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
THE REASONS FOR WAGE RIGIDITY 789 
Gordon, Donald F., "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Eco-
nomic InqUIry, XII (1974), 431-59 
Hart, OlIver D , "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetnc InformatIOn: An 
IntroductIOn," Review of Economic StudieS, L (1983), 3-35. 
HashImoto, Masanon, and Ben T Yu, "SpecIfic CapItal. Employment Contracts, 
and Wage RIgidIty," Bell Journal of Economics, XI (1980), 536-49 
Kahn, Shulamit. "EVIdence of Nominal Wage Stickiness from Microdata," Amen-
can EconomIC ReVieW, forthcoming 
Kahneman, Damel, Jack L Knetsch, and RIchard Thaler, "FaIrness as a Con-
stramt on Profit Seekmg' Entitlements m the Market," Amencan Economic 
ReVieW, LXXVI (1986), 728-41. 
Kaufman, Roger T , "On Wage StICkmess m Bntam's CompetJtlVe Sector," Bntlsh 
Journal of Indu5trwl RelatIOns, XXII (1984),101-12 
Knetsch, Jack L., "AssumptIons, BehaVIOral Fmdmgs, and PolIcy AnalYSIS," Jour-
nal of PolICY AnalYSIS and Management, XIV (1995), 68-78. 
Lebow, DaVId E , DaVId J Stockton, and WIlham L Wascher, "Inflation, Nommal 
Wage RIgidity, and the EffiCiency of Labor Markets," Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors, Fmance and EconOllllcs DIscussion Senes, 94-45, October 
1995 
LeVIne, DaVId I , "Fairness, Markets, and Abihty to Pay Evidence from Compen-
satJOn Executives," Amencan Economic RevLCw, LXXXIII (1993),1241-59 
Lmdbeck, AssaI', and Denms J. Snower, The InSider-OutsIder Theory of Employ-
ment and Unemployment (Cambndge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) 
Martm, .Joanne, "Relative Depl'lVatIOn A Theory of DistnbutIve InjustIce for an 
Era of Shnnkmg Resources," m Larry L Commmgs and Barry M Staw, eds , 
Re~earch In OrganizatIOnal BehaVIOr. An Annual Se1'le5 of Analytical Essays 
and Cntlcal ReView, volume 3 (GreenwIch, CT JAI Press, 1981) 
McLaughlm, Kenneth J., "RIgid Wages?" Journal of Monetary Economics, XXXIV 
(1994), 383-414. 
Salop, Steven C , "A Model ofthe Natural Rate of Unemployment," Amencan Eco-
nomiC ReView, LXIX (1979), 117-25 
Schhcht, Ekkehart, "Labor Turnover, Wage Structure and Natural Unemploy-
ment," Zeltschnft fur die Gesamte Staatswlssewnschaft, CXXXIV (1978), 
337-46 
ShapIro, Carl, and Joseph E StIglItz, "EqmlIbnum Unemployment as a Worker 
Dlscipline DeVIce," Amertcan Economic RevlCw, LXXIV (1984),433-44. 
Solow, Robert M , "Another POSSIble Source of Wage Shckmess " Journal of Mac-
roeconomiCS, I (1979), 79-82 
Shghlz, Joseph E , "Alternative Theones of Wage DetermmatIon and Unemploy-
ment m L DC's: The Labor Turnover Model," Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ICS, LXXXVIII (1974), 194-227 
--, "Theones of Wage RIgidity," 1Il James L ButkieWICZ, Kenneth ,J Koford, 
and Jeffrey B MIller, eds ,Keynes' Economlc Legacy Contemporary Econorttlc 
Theol'les (New York Praeger PublIshers, 1986). 
Taylor, John B , "Staggered Wage Settlllg m a Macro Model," Amencan EconOlmc 
ReVlcw, LXIX (1979),108-18 
U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor StatlstIcs, Compensatwn and Work-
mg Condttwns (Washlllgton, DC: GPO, 1994). 
WeISS, Andrew, "Job Queues and Layoffs 1Il Labor Markets WIth FleXIble Wages," 
Journal of Polltlcal Economy, LXXXVIII (1980), 526---38. 
--, EfficU'ncy Wages Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage DlsperslOn 
(Pnnceton, NJ' Prmceton Umverslty Press, 1990) 
Yellen, ,Janet L , "Efficiency Wage Models ofUnemploynwnt," American Economic 
ReVieW, LXXIV (1984),200-05 
Co ri hI © 2001. All Ri hIs Reserved. 
